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New network structures:  decentralization, 
prosumers and the role of online platforms
This issue of the Network Industries Quarterly looks into the major 
challenges infrastructure regulation is currently facing as a result 
of technology, indirect network effects, newly emerging network 
structures, and new actors. The rapidly evolving Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) have significantly challenged 
the traditionally stable landscape of infrastructure services provision. 
The new data layer over the traditional infrastructure and service 
layers is transforming network industries: online platforms create 
new indirect network effects, they allow new service providers to 
enter the market , and they challenge the central role of traditional 
infrastructure managers/service providers as entities ensuring the 
coordination of the sectors. 
The de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an on-
going process at both the national and global levels. As this process 
unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge, necessitating a constant 
reassessment of the content and objectives of regulation.
Following the 7th Conference on Regulation of Infrastructures 
which took place on June 21 and 22, 2018 with a particular focus on 
the regulatory challenges facing network industries in the transport, 
telecoms, water and energy sectors, four papers were selected for this 
publication due to their topical relevance.
Frieden examines how Internet ventures operate as intermediaries 
serving both upstream sources of content and applications, as well 
as downstream consumers, and  considers how governments can 
respond to the onset of price and quality of service discrimination 
within the Internet ecosystem.  
Knieps looks at ICT innovations as the key drivers for a paradigm 
shift from traditional intramodal transportation markets to 
intermodal shared mobility markets. He identifies the changing 
necessities of regulations regarding market entry, public subsidies, 
and technical regulations, and presents the potentials of pilot 
projects, as well as the impact of shared mobility on congestion and 
pollution.
Rossotto et al. analyse the existing literature on digital platforms and 
distinguish four aspects, which policy makers should keep in mind, 
working on appropriate policy frameworks for digital platforms in 
emerging markets. These four aspects are:  definition of multisided-
platforms; emerging business models; technology and behavioral 
enablers; platform competitive dynamics.
Finally,  Vanrykel, Ernst and Bourgeois look at the platform 
Share&Charge, and  present its functioning and potential, before 
assessing the tax treatment of operations involved in the use of the 
platform.
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I. Introduction
Several segments of the Information, Communica-tions and Entertainment (ICE) marketplace have dominant intermediaries that operate a platform 
needed by both upstream sources of content and down-
stream consumers.  These ventures can achieve market 
dominance in a ‘winner take all’ (Malik 2015) competi-
tion by creating the dominant platform standing between 
upstream content sources and downstream consumers 
(Schumpeter 2017). In the markets for broadband car-
riage and many Internet service segments, such as social 
networking, winning ventures quickly can accrue scale and 
efficiency advantages as more and more consumers join the 
bandwagon and subscribe (Gal and  Elkin-Koren 2017).   
Successful insertion of an intermediary platform has gen-
erated both positive and negative impacts on consumer 
welfare, competition, the rate of innovation, employment 
and other key factors.  On the positive side, intermediaries 
can promote efficiency and positive network externalities 
(Katz and Shapiro 1985; Moffatt 2016) where the overall 
value of a network and its ability to generate consumer 
benefits grows as more users participate.  On the negative 
side, intermediaries, operating without significant com-
petition, can extract high prices from both upstream and 
downstream participants, erect strong barriers to market 
entry,  acquire competitors and use comparative advantag-
es to dominate in both core and related markets such as 
the collection, processing and sale of ‘Big Data’ (Helveston 
2016) about subscriber behavior. 
Economists use the term two-sided markets to identify 
platform functions where transactions occur both upstream 
and downstream from the intermediary (Rochet and  Tiro-
le 2003, 2006; Armstrong 2006; Filstrucchi, Geradin, van 
Damme and Affeldt 2014).  The business models used by 
intermediaries often rely on a strategic calibration of pric-
How Internet Platforms Intermediaries Affect Competition and 
Consumers
Rob Frieden*  
This paper examines how Internet ventures operate as intermediaries serving both upstream sources of content and applications as well as downstream 
consumers. It considers how governments can respond to the onset of price and quality of service discrimination within the Internet ecosystem. The 
paper concludes that most governments have failed to revise and recalibrate tools that examine potential marketplace distortions and the potential 
for harm to competition and consumers.  Regulatory agencies and courts have generated false positives, resulting in market intervention where no 
major problem exists, but also false negatives, where undetected major problems cause harm without remedy.  The paper recommends a recalibration 
of market definition and analysis, including examination of both downstream and upstream impacts.
es, often appearing to provide ‘free’ , or subsidized services 
to users on one side of the platform, typically downstream 
consumers.   Consumers can access valuable services with 
zero financial payments, but they do have to pay by per-
mitting intermediaries to compile information about their 
wants, needs, desires, Internet uses, searches and other be-
havior that can be processed and marketed to advertisers 
for better targeting of their commercial pitches.   Privacy 
intrusions (Pasquale 2013) and the commodification of 
consumer behavior generate significant value that a plat-
form operator can accrue often without subscribers fully 
understanding and quantifying the potential for reduced 
benefits. 
This paper identifies defects in the ways most government 
currently respond to allegations of harm to consumers and 
competition.  Governments can refrain from regulating 
access and tolerate market concentration as the proper re-
ward for ventures offering desirable content and carriage 
services.  Alternatively, they can impose ex ante safeguards 
to remedy anticipated harms to competition and consum-
ers such as market concentration, price discrimination, re-
duced consumer welfare and captured consumer surpluses. 
Between these poles, governments can rely on courts or an 
expert regulatory agency to evaluate complaints and offer 
calibrated remedies.  
The paper recommends that courts and government 
agencies should address marketplace distortions by recali-
brating existing tools to examine the competitive and con-
sumer impacts on both sides of an intermediary’s platform. 
II. Consumer Benefits from Two-Sided Markets
Intermediaries have operated in many marketplaces for 
centuries (Cohen 2018). Emerging broadband, digital 
platforms radically enhance the power and impact of such 
ventures resulting in vast changes to “the traditional equi-
* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State University, rmf5@psu.edu
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libria of supply and demand, blurring the lines between 
owners and users, producers and consumers, workers and 
contractors, and transcending the spatial divides of per-
sonal and professional, business and home, market and lei-
sure, friend and client, acquaintances and stranger, public 
and private.” (Lobel 2016: 90) Digital broadband platform 
operators can accrue substantial consumer benefits even as 
they increase market shares.  A ‘win-win’ scenario com-
bines ample benefits for platform operators and consumers 
by enhancing the value proposition in commercial trans-
actions.
Digital broadband platform operators can quickly ac-
quire scale economies (Peritt 2017) and efficiency gains by 
attracting growing numbers of users and spreading costs 
over a large population of users. The incremental cost to 
add an additional participant approaches zero, because 
many Internet-mediated markets have high initial, invest-
ment costs, but very low incremental costs incurred when 
adding users. Additionally, these platforms can accrue 
positive networking externalities (Lemley and McGowan 
1998; Newman 2012) as subscribership grows.  When in-
termediaries reach a critical mass of popularity, non-users 
see the advantages in joining the bandwagon which further 
enhances the comparative attractiveness of a specific plat-
form operator vis a vis other competitors and options. 
Platform intermediaries must deliver a compelling value 
proposition to generate consumer use, particularly when 
alternatives exist, with low entry barriers and switching 
costs.  The combination of competitive necessity and more 
efficient operations can readily translate into the offering 
of lower priced products and services to consumers, par-
ticularly because two-sided platform operators can cali-
brate how much to charge each side:“[P]rofit-maximizing 
prices may require charging one side less than the marginal 
cost of serving that side.  Empirical surveys of industries 
based on . . .[two-sided platforms] find many examples of 
prices that are low, or even negative, so that customers on 
one side are incentivized to participate in the platform” 
(Evans and Noel 2005:668). 
III. Consumer Costs from Two-Sided Markets
Immediate and longer-term costs offset readily identifia-
ble benefits from two-sided platforms.  In the short term, 
ventures like Amazon enhance consumer welfare by offer-
ing a growing inventory of products and services at lower 
prices, the product of operational efficiencies and the will-
ingness to eschew profits in exchange for increasing market 
share and scope.  However, in the longer term, consumers 
may suffer from the loss of competition from ‘bricks and 
mortar’, local vendors as well as from the consequences 
of ever more accurate assessment of consumer price sen-
sitivity and increasingly invasive collection of subscribers’ 
consumption behavior and the brokering of such data by 
largely unregulated ventures (Kuempel 2016).  At some 
point, online platform operators may consider their mar-
ket position sufficiently impenetrable so that they can re-
frain from aggressive price cutting and forgoing near term 
profitability.  
Additionally, these operators may have so developed data 
analytics that they can quite accurately set and frequent-
ly modify prices with an eye toward maximising profits 
(Fleming 2015).  Dynamic pricing refers to the ability of 
product and service vendors to change prices quickly by 
collecting and analysing data about current consumer de-
mand (Calo 2014; Adame 2016). Rather than set a fixed 
price, only occasionally raised or lowered, vendors can 
make frequent pricing changes based on current market-
place conditions.  While such dynamic pricing arguably 
represents an efficiency enhancing, fine-tuning of price set-
ting, consumers may consider it unfair and discriminatory. 
IV. Subscriber Data Value and Lock-in Cost Missing in 
the Cost/Benefit Analysis 
One can readily assess the benefits of access to intermedi-
ary platforms, but the costs are not as readily determined. 
Consumers may wrongly assume that they have free access, 
because no subscription payment occurs except to the car-
rier providing the broadband link.  The free access conclu-
sion fails to consider two somewhat hidden and not easily 
quantifiable costs: 1) the increase in the price of advertised 
goods and services, possibly better calibrated through data 
mining and 2) the monetary value accruing to intermedi-
aries when they acquire, collate, analyse and sell consum-
er data, as well as auction advertising placements on their 
web sites (Bodie, Cherry, McCormick and Tang 2017; 
Woodcock 2017; Hacker and Petkova 2017).  
Broadband intermediaries have achieved remarkable suc-
cess in developing techniques to monitor, surveil, collect 
and sell subscriber data.  This reduces the value position 
of what the intermediary offers because the ability to 
‘mine’ subscriber data has value that can provide a substan-
tial, new revenue stream from freely collected consumer 
data.  
V. Deficiencies in Existing Government Oversight 
Models
Outside the European Union, (European Parliament 
2016) most governments have failed to revise existing legal, 
regulatory and jurisprudential models and frameworks for 
application to issues raised by the onset of digital broad-
Network Industries Quarterly |  Vol. 20 | N°2 | June 2018              4
dossier
band intermediary platforms.  This section addresses how 
traditional governmental strategies ignore fundamental 
differences between bricks and mortar and Internet-medi-
ated transactions.
As a threshold matter, governments decide whether and 
how to intervene in a specific industry sector.  They may 
opt to rely entirely on marketplace forces, confident that 
competition will force stakeholders to operate in ways 
that deliver a compelling value proposition for consum-
ers without anticompetitive practices.  Other governments 
may pursue the opposite: an interventionist approach, 
imposing ex ante rules and regulations, such as network 
neutrality (Frieden 2015) and common carrier regulation. 
Between these polar opposites, two alternative, possibly 
complementary, ex post strategies exist: 1) apply antitrust, 
consumer protection and prohibitions on unfair trade 
practices to remedy proven harms and 2) use dispute reso-
lution through litigation and complaint filing procedures 
to fashion remedies that typically impose monetary fines 
and compulsory modification of business practices.
Each of the legacy models fails to achieve an ideal balance 
between governmental regulatory forbearance and inter-
vention, primarily because the assumptions, strategies and 
tactics applied do not make essential adjustments reflecting 
the difference between digital, broadband networking and 
preexisting channels of commerce.  Without modification 
of market definition and impact assessment, governments 
risk false positives, which trigger unnecessary marketplace 
intervention, or by reaching false negatives, which fail to 
trigger important safeguards based on an incorrect deter-
mination that no harm to consumers or competition has, 
or will occur.
VI. A Realistic Assessment of Platform Costs and 
Benefits 
Consumers and governments may not fully understand 
the tradeoffs when digital, broadband intermediaries dom-
inate many ICE market segments.  One can readily ap-
preciate the upside consumer benefits in having access to 
advertiser-supported content and Internet markets subsi-
dised by ventures willing to forego short term profits for 
longer term market share and product diversification.  A 
more difficult undertaking calculates what direct and indi-
rect costs consumers incur, presently and in the future, for 
the opportunity to participate in ‘winner take all’ two-sid-
ed markets.
Prevailing economic doctrine, widely embraced by 
government legislators, judges and regulators, favors an 
inclination not to intervene in the marketplace, when 
identifiable, near term cost savings and other welfare en-
hancements flow to consumers.  Much revered, so-called 
Chicago School marketplace assumptions (Bork 1978; 
Posner 1979; Crane 2014) and antitrust prescriptions may 
not make sense for digital, platform markets including the 
view that rational commercial actors (such as Amazon) 
never would pursue below market pricing given the un-
likely opportunity to recoup current losses in the future. 
Likewise, a laser focus on efficiency and consumer welfare, 
as espoused by Robert Bork, may require a longer time-
span that considers whether immediate and easily meas-
ured, short-term consumer welfare enhancements partially 
or completely offset in the longer-term.  Such analysis re-
quires scrutiny of both downstream and upstream market 
effects. 
At the very least, it has become increasingly clear that 
consumers must contribute more value, than what they 
might infer from widespread promotion of ‘free’ and sub-
sidised access.  
Even in the short run, the value proposition from par-
ticipating in two-sided markets may decline as consumers 
begin to understand the monetary value of the network 
usage data they generate and consent to having platform 
operators use for dynamic pricing of their goods and ser-
vices and as a marketable commodity for sale to upstream 
advertisers. 
In the longer term, the commodification of consumer 
data may accrue the greatest strategic and financial advan-
tages for ventures that already have successfully exploited 
positive network externalities and have acquired large mar-
ket shares.  This advantage stifles innovation and compe-
tition if consumers cannot freely change their platform 
subscription and take their business to another platform. 
In the Internet ecosystem, consumers often lack complete 
information about what they must pay and what they lose 
in exchange for the opportunity to become a subscriber. 
Few consumers may have the disposition and wherewith-
al to undertake regular cost/benefit analyses as well as a 
determination whether to stick with the status quo, or to 
seek better terms and conditions.  Such inertia enhances 
the ability of incumbent unicorn firms to maintain their 
market dominance. 
Simply put, digital broadband consumers may likely suf-
fer more significant, but not readily quantifiable harms, as 
digital, broadband intermediaries find new and more pre-
cise ways to maximize revenues from both upstream and 
downstream sources.  Real or perceived lock-in by incum-
bent firms help maintain their market dominance.
Government agencies with jurisdiction to monitor such 
actions appear ill-equipped to provide effective oversight 
based on their fealty to now questionable economic and 
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antitrust theory, the inability or unwillingness to consider 
costs and benefits on both sides of the two-sided market 
and their emphasis on short term consumer benefits that 
may not seem as generous as initially estimated. 
The Way Forward
Regulatory agencies with jurisdiction to safeguard con-
sumers and reviewing courts should better calibrate the 
tools they use to investigate the potentially harmful effects 
of platform intermediaries on competition and consum-
ers, with emphasis on the potential for privacy intrusions, 
unfair trade practices, market concentration and anticom-
petitive tactics.  The goals for recalibration should focus 
on acquiring a better understanding of platform operator 
practices and their impacts rather than serve as a justifi-
cation for more intrusive government oversight.  Such a 
holistic approach can better assess the costs and benefits 
generated by platform intermediaries.
1) Assess Impacts on Both Sides of a Platform
To achieve greater clarity on the potential for beneficial 
and harm impact, courts and government agencies should 
examine platform operations on both upstream and down-
stream market sides.  Using a cost benefit analysis, they 
may determine that harmful impacts on one side are offset 
by benefits on the other side.  In other instances, they may 
identify greater harms or benefits when examining both 
sides.  
By examining both sides of a digital, broadband platform 
market, courts and regulatory agencies can enhance the 
accuracy of their assessment of competition and wheth-
er consumers benefit or suffer from doing business with 
intermediaries having significant market share.  In turn, 
they can better calibrate a remedy, or reach an empirically 
supported conclusion that no market intervention is nec-
essary.
2) Consider Whether and How Lock-In Exists
Courts and regulatory agencies should consider the ser-
vice options available to digital, broadband subscribers.  In 
some instances, they have ample choices that prevent lock-
in and evidence a competitive marketplace.  However, in 
other instances, lock-in occurs, because consumers have 
few alternatives, or they incur costs, inconvenience, or re-
duced benefits if they leave the dominant platform.
Lock-in can occur even when alternative options exist. 
For example, an electronic commerce site, like eBay, may 
steer subscribers to a former affiliated electronic funds 
transfer platform operated by PayPal, even though alter-
native payment systems exist.  Consumers have incentives 
to use PayPal, because the eBay site appears to favor and 
expedite such transactions and most vendors prefer to re-
ceive payment via PayPal.  The preference for PayPal and 
the greater ease consumers have in using the preferred pay-
ment system generate substantial motivations to take the 
promoted and preferred path of least resistance.
Courts and regulatory agencies should consider the po-
tential for lock-in beyond simply assessing whether a 
specific market segment has multiple platform operators. 
The existence of alternatives, by itself, does not evidence 
a competitive marketplace which can self-regulate.  In the 
absence of viable service alternatives, courts and regulators 
should consider downstream consumers’ quality of expe-
rience to ensure that the apparent preference for a single 
platform option promotes convenience and enhances con-
sumer welfare.
3) Assess Market Impacts, Rather Than Simply 
Calculate Market Share
As noted, courts and regulators generally refrain from 
reaching conclusions about market competitiveness based 
solely on calculations showing a concentrated market, or 
one dominated by a single venture.  Large firms having 
high market share may evidence a firm’s superior business 
acumen, or the need for ventures to accrue economies of 
scale to thrive in a specific market segment. 
On the other hand, market dominance may have signif-
icant and potentially adverse impacts on consumers and 
the potential for competition.  Significant harm may arise 
because a firm can leverage dominance in one market to 
dominate other market segments.  For example, Google 
dominates the market for Internet search and advertising, 
despite ample alternatives. Regulatory or judicial interven-
tion is not warranted simply because Google has acquired 
substantial market share in Internet search.  However, the 
company’s success in dominating the search market also 
translates into substantial market share in the auctioning 
of advertising opportunities to search consumers (New-
man 2014), making it possible for the company to impose 
anticompetitive terms and conditions.  
Courts and regulators may need to consider the inter-re-
lationship between a venture’s successes in two or more 
markets, because dominance in combined, or interdepend-
ent markets, may trigger new or greater risks for consum-
ers.  Just as platform intermediary operation affects both 
downstream and upstream users, so too can market success 
in one market generate uncontested opportunities to ex-
tend market power elsewhere.  Such leverage may have ad-
verse impacts on the potential for new competition, even 
from innovative ventures.  
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VII. Conclusion
Digital broadband technologies and markets have reached 
a critical mass of market penetration and efficiency en-
hancements highlighted by embedded platforms.  The In-
ternet ecosystem has many market segments predominated 
by single ventures that have acquired dominance in ‘win-
ner take all’ competition that rewards ventures best able to 
exploit positive network externalities.  Intermediaries have 
conferred significant, identifiable benefits to consumers, 
who also incur offsetting costs, not all of which can be 
easily quantified or measured.
Intermediary platforms operators can calibrate cost recov-
ery from both upstream and downstream users.  In many 
instances, downstream consumers have benefitted from 
subsidies and pricing strategies that reduce, or eliminate 
direct, out of pocket costs.  However, subsidy payers, such 
as advertisers, eventually recoup their costs through higher 
charges for goods and services.  In light of enhancements 
in the acquisition, analysis and marketing of consumer be-
havior data, both vendors and platform intermediaries now 
have more diversified and extensive ways to recoup costs 
and to improve prospects for generating more revenues. 
Such data mining can impose new costs on consumers 
who must tolerate ever more extensive privacy intrusions 
in exchange for access to so-called free services.  Enhanced 
consumer surveillance can impose lower or higher costs as 
exemplified by dynamic pricing that frequently changes 
rates through algorithmic analysis of overall demand, as 
well as a prediction of a prospective customer’s intensity of 
preference for a particular good, or service.
Considering the mixed impacts of embedded intermedi-
aries on competition and consumers, legislatures, courts 
and regulators should apply new tools for assessing current 
and prospective impacts.  Unfortunately, the speed of in-
novation and the convergence of technologies and markets 
have exceeded the ability of governments to stay current. 
Accordingly, the tools used to assess market impacts have 
become ill-suited and poorly calibrated to meet new chal-
lenges (Brandenburger, Breed and Schoning 2017).  Con-
ventional competition policy and economic theories lack 
an emphasis on identifying both short term and longer-
term consequences of platform operations. While imme-
diate consumer welfare enhancement supports regulatory 
forbearance, governments need to consider whether and 
how longer-term impacts will remain benign or favorable.
In too many instances, governments have overstated 
consumer benefits and the absence of competitive harm. 
Most courts and regulatory agencies have not considered 
an intermediary’s impact on both upstream and down-
stream markets, failed to consider fully whether and how 
subscriber lock-in has occurred and generated rationales 
excusing substantial market concentration based on short 
term consumer benefits that may not be as generous if off-
setting privacy intrusions are considered. 
Going forward, governments should appreciate that plat-
form intermediaries do not operate as charities and that 
the conferral of benefits to consumers may be offset by 
negative impacts on both consumers and competition, 
even in the short term.  A more holistic examination of im-
pacts, without placing a premium on short term consumer 
benefits, would generate a more accurate assessment of the 
mixed impacts generated by platform intermediaries.
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Network Economics of Shared Mobility1
*Prof. Dr. Günter Knieps
ICT innovations are the key drivers for a paradigm shift from traditional intramodal transportation markets to intermodal shared mobility markets. 
The changing necessities of regulations regarding market entry, public subsidies, and technical regulations are identified, and the potentials of pilot 
projects, as well as the impact of shared mobility on congestion and pollution, are analyzed.
The evolution of markets for shared mobility services
Shared mobility services provide transportation ser-vices without requiring individual ownership of the vehicles for exclusive use. Shared mobility ser-
vices can be non-commercial (for example, reciprocal ride 
sharing organized by a peer group) or commercial. There 
are many forms of commercial provision of shared mo-
bility services, either by small-scale vehicles (such as cars, 
minibuses, and bicycles) or mass transit of large capaci-
ty transportation (trains, subways, etc.). The owner of a 
car may rent his or her vehicle out for others to use for 
limited periods of time, or offer taxi services organized 
by a ride-sourcing company. Alternatively, vehicles may 
be owned by a platform operator organizing on-demand 
transportation services or may be in shared ownership or-
ganized on a peer-to-peer basis, or vehicles may provide rail 
and bus transit: “…rail and bus transit were the most fre-
quently used shared modes, followed by bikesharing, car-
sharing, and ridesourcing …” (Feigon and Murphy 2016: 
7). On-demand mobility can be provided via self-service 
concepts or for-hire service concepts. For fully automated 
(driverless) vehicles, the concept of self-service is changing, 
as the real-time driving activity is no longer performed by 
the driver and has shifted to a platform (Transportation 
Research Board 2015:  1–22; US Department of Transpor-
tation, Federal Highway Administration 2017, chapters 1, 
2). 
An important consequence of shared mobility is the con-
vergence of intramodal transportation markets towards 
intermodal shared mobility markets. An evolving multi-
plicity of combinations between shared mobility services 
provides substitutes for individual private car trips, such 
as taxis, car rentals, car sharing, minibuses, buses, and 
high-capacity public transit with trains, subways, or tram-
ways. The smaller bundling advantages of shared cars and 
minibuses may be combined with the greater bundling 
advantages of buses and the even greater bundling advan-
tages of high-capacity public transit by providing seamless 
shared mobility service networks. Boundaries are begin-
ning to blur between shared on-demand mobility services 
(such as bus-on-demand services) with flexible stops and 
routes, and public transit with scheduled (timetabled) ser-
vices with fixed stops and routes. Shared mobility can ex-
tend the scope of public transit, providing feeder services 
for public transit by tackling the first-and-last-mile prob-
lem (US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 
Administration 2017: ix).
Virtual networks for shared mobility services 
Although there are different types of shared mobility 
services with heterogeneous information and communica-
tion technologies (ICT) requirements, they typically rely 
on real-time, location-based information to enable app-
based operating platforms coordinating and organizing 
the on-demand provision of mobility services. Examples 
are bicycle sharing, car sharing, ride sharing, ride sourcing, 
minibus-on-demand with virtual stops and flexible routes, 
driverless shared mobility services, and (high-capacity) 
public transit. On-demand mobility services require re-
al-time, location-based mobile communication services 
combined with mobility apps. App-based mobility services 
result in a convergence of transportation services provided 
by taxis, private hire vehicles, and ride-sourcing platforms 
(commercial transport apps) (OECD/ITF 2016c). 
From a network economic perspective, the complementa-
ry role of virtual networks for the design of smart physical 
networks is important, combining a required QoS band-
width capacity with other virtual components (Knieps 
2018). Virtual networks for shared mobility services are 
based on combinations of real-time mobile communica-
tions, global navigation system services (geopositioning), 
and sensor-generated data processing (OECD/ITF, 2015b, 
2016b). Infrastructure-generated data are increasingly re-
placed by sensor-generated data via mobile phones, on-
1 Helpful comments by the participants of the 7th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures, in particular by Matthias Finger and Juan José 
Montero Pascual as well as Volker Stocker are gratefully acknowledged.
* University of Freiburg, Chair of Network Economics, Competition Economics and Transport Science. guenter.knieps@vwl.uni-freiburg.de
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board navigation devices, and vehicle-to-vehicle commu-
nications. ICT for shared mobility services are based on 
multi-platform sensoring technologies as well as data stor-
age and transmission capacity in vehicles that are able to 
precisely locate and track people and vehicles supported by 
global navigation satellite systems (GNNS). Examples of 
location-based data services include taxi-hailing apps and 
ride-hailing apps, road navigation and multi-modal rout-
ing services, and multi-modal big data processing (OECD/
ITF 2016b; GNNS 2017).
Shared mobility markets and the challenges for 
regulations
The necessity for institutional reforms, including free en-
try into shared mobility markets, competition for subsi-
dies, and technical regulations, are considered below.
• Free entry and competition in shared mobility mar-
kets
The abolition of legal entry barriers and regulatory mar-
ket splits is unavoidable. Prosumer peer-to-peer activities 
as well as business-oriented market activities providing 
shared mobility can only flourish if all legal entry barriers 
in the markets for transport services are abolished. Market 
entry regulations with licenses and public price fixing, as 
in the German taxi market, serve to establish cartels. Such 
market regulation not only interferes with price competi-
tion and market-driven entry and exit decisions, but also 
obstructs the search for new innovative mobility concepts. 
Due to app-based ICT innovations, services provided by 
taxis, private-hire vehicles, and ride sourcing services are 
converging and belong to the same relevant market for in-
dividualized mobility. Entry regulations via licenses, geo-
graphic restrictions, and fare setting for taxis are not only 
contrary to the general principles of open markets but also 
cause artificial regulatory market splits compared to pri-
vate-hire vehicles and ride sourcing services (OECD/ITF 
2016c:  6). Moreover, competition between individualized 
mobility services and shared on-demand mobility services 
with shared taxis, taxi buses and bus-on-demand services 
should not be disturbed by regulatory market splits.
• Competition for subsidies of public non-cost cover-
ing shared mobility services 
The comparative advantages of different forms of shared 
mobility services are relevant in densely populated urban 
areas, but also in rural areas with low population density. 
A major change is that the concept of “public transport” 
is no longer limited to scheduled services, but can also in-
clude on-demand mobility services (OECD/ITF  2015c). 
If demand is so low during certain periods of the day that 
offering a scheduled train or bus services would result in 
large deficits, the publicly desired transport service could 
be provided by a shared minibus or shared taxi service; 
even individual ride-sourcing trips should not be exclud-
ed. In the context of a transparent bidding procedure, the 
most cost-efficient public mobility service can be chosen, 
exhausting the comparative advantages of scheduled mo-
bility services versus on-demand mobility services depend-
ing on the local/regional demand circumstances and thus 
minimizing public subsidies. 
• Technical regulations and consumer protection
Technical regulations in shared mobility markets focus-
ing on health and safety, as well as insurance and consumer 
protection through adequate laws and technical standards, 
are gaining increasing relevance and have raised controver-
sial debates regarding the extent to which additional rul-
ings are necessary (Transportation Research Board 2015: 
62–71). Other issues regarding the interaction of public 
and private spheres are parking and access to public space, 
both for private businesses and for non-profit purposes, 
with competing operators and transportation services as 
well as taxation on shared mobility. Data sharing (open 
data), data privacy protection, and cybercrime protection 
are also gaining relevance. Of particular importance is safe-
guarding privacy in the context of location-based mobili-
ty data (OECD/ITF 2016b:21–26;  OECD/ITF  2015b: 
33–58). 
Get the bandwagon rolling: The role of pilot projects 
“Kutsuplus”, the world’s first pilot project providing a 
fully automated, real-time on-demand public minibus 
service with flexible routes and virtual stops, started in 
2012 in Helsinki. The project was initiated by Helsinki 
Regional Transport Authority (HSL) to provide incentives 
to substitute private car trips with an on-demand mini-
bus service, thereby reducing congestion and air pollution. 
Routes were optimized on the basis of real-time trip or-
ders from customers using a GPS-enabled smartphone. 
Passengers with roughly the same pick-up and end-point 
locations were allocated to the same vehicle. The platform 
bundled all requests with similar routes and informed users 
about the closest virtual stop. The transportation service 
of Kutsuplus offered a flexible, real-time-based choice of 
routes without fixed departure times or fixed entry and exit 
points, comparable to a shared taxi service. The goal was to 
assess the technical feasibility of the project and to get ex-
perience on user acceptance over a three-year period. The 
Kutsuplus pilot project gained worldwide attention as an 
innovative forerunner ICT project that could provide new 
impulses to public transit with a real-time on-demand ser-
vice that strongly reduced private individual car traffic. It 
was considered a success due to strongly growing demand 
Network Industries Quarterly |  Vol. 20 | N°2 | June 2018              10
dossier
and customer requests to extend the service areas. A fur-
ther expansion of the service network would have required 
a significant increase from 15 minibuses to 45 in 2016 and 
to more than 100 in 2017, but the necessary investments 
could not be realized.2 Nevertheless, the goal is to develop 
further shared mobility services based on more extended 
Kutsuplus-type services (Helsinki Regional Transport Au-
thority (HSL), 2016). Although the minibuses in the Kut-
suplus pilot project were able to choose demand-oriented 
virtual stops and virtual routes on a fully automated basis, 
they still involved drivers, which were a high cost factor. 
Therefore, the start of a regular bus line in Helsinki with 
a driverless bus in 20173 is opening up  interesting new 
perspectives for the future. In the meantime, the potential 
for Kutsuplus-type bus-on-demand services are also being 
considered in other towns; examples include the American 
city of St. Louis, Missouri4 and a ride-pooling-project in 
Hamburg starting in January 2019.5 
Shared mobility markets as driver to reduce 
congestion and pollution 
The future role of shared mobility markets in reducing 
congestion and environmental problems within cities is a 
challenging problem worldwide. The question of the ex-
tent to which shared on-demand mobility services such as 
shared taxis, taxi-buses, or bus-on-demand should replace 
private car traffic is highly controversial. Moreover, the in-
teraction between shared on-demand mobility services and 
high-capacity public transit by train, subway, ferry, and 
tramway plays an important role.
In recent years, the International Transport Forum at the 
OECD has conducted several simulation studies to investi-
gate the impact shared on-demand mobility services would 
have on replacing other forms of travel and thus reducing 
traffic congestion and air pollution. Within a real urban 
context under the application of real mobility and network 
data, different reform scenarios have been analyzed, with 
particular focus on the complete or partial replacement of 
private car traffic by shared on-demand mobility services. 
It is assumed that a central mobility dispatcher coordinates 
the matching of shared vehicles to passengers, centralizing 
all real-time information and optimizing routes and stops 
to fit the transportation requirements of each passenger, 
according to a set of time-minimizing rules. Depending 
on heterogeneous travel requirements, different quality 
standards regarding travel time and travel duration may be 
offered. Shared mobility simulations were carried out for 
Auckland, New Zealand’s largest city (OECD/ITF 2017a); 
for Lisbon, a mid-sized European city (OECD/ITF 2015a, 
OECD/ITF 2016a); a follow-up study for the greater 
Lisbon Metropolitan Area (OECD/ITF 2017b); and for 
the Helsinki Metropolitan Area in Finland (OECD/ITF 
2017c). Different scenarios are considered, differentiating, 
for instance, according to whether all private cars are being 
replaced or only a subset, whether all public transit trips 
with busses and rail continue or whether bus trips also are 
replaced by shared on-demand mobility services. Differ-
ent shared mobility services are considered, typically with 
shared taxis (six passengers) and taxi buses (8–16 passen-
gers); only the first Lisbon study (OECD/ITF 2015a) also 
considered sequential individual transport (“AutoVots”). 
There is also differentiation regarding whether the shared 
on-demand mobility service is provided with fully auto-
mated (driverless) vehicles or with a human driver.
In a scenario where all private car trips are replaced by 
shared taxi or taxi bus and all other trips are taken via pub-
lic high capacity transit, walking and cycling, the simula-
tion studies all arrive at the same conclusion: congestion 
is strongly reduced or disappears completely, and pollu-
tion is also drastically reduced. For Lisbon, the simulation 
showed if all cars and bus trips were replaced by a fleet 
of six-seat vehicles (shared taxis) that offer on-demand 
door-to-door shared rides in combination with a fleet of 
eight- and 16-person minibuses (taxi buses), the car fleet 
would only be 3 percent of the current fleet and total ve-
hicle-kilometers would be reduced by 37 percent (OECD/
ITF 2016a: 8). The benefits of shared mobility even in-
crease when greater Metropolitan areas are considered, due 
to the greater importance of shared mobility services in 
providing feeder services to public transit. Even if only 50 
percent or 20 percent of private car trips were replaced by 
on-demand shared mobility services and the bus services 
continued, there would still be a significant reduction of 
congestion and CO2 to be expected for the Helsinki Met-
ropolitan Area (OECD/ITF 2017c: 53). For Auckland, it 
was found that if all trips currently being made by private 
car were made by shared mobility services, congestion and 
emissions as well as distance driven would be cut in half. 
Even if the switch to shared mobility services was only par-
tial, a significant effect on congestion and CO2 could be 
observed (OECD/ITF 2017a:6).
2 S. Egerton-Read: Why did Helsinki’s on-demand mobility service fail?, Circulate, 6. February 17, http://circulatenews.org/2017/02/finlands-kut-
suplus-cautionary-note-promise-demand-mobility/
3 City of Helsinki: Helsinki to Launch Self-Driving Bus in Regular Service, 15 June 2017, https://www.hel.fi/uutiset/en/helsinki/helsinki-self-driv-
ing-bus-regular-service 
4 J. Cohen: St. Louis Looks to On-Demand Transit for Downtown Mobility, Next City, 20 February 2018, https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/st.-louis-looks-
to-on-demand-transit-for-downtown-mobility
5 JMOIA: Wir sind behördlich genehmigt!, 26 April 2018, https://www.moia.io/de/blog/2018/wir-sind-behoerdlich-genehmigt/
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Digital Platforms: A Policy Framework for Developing 
Countries
Carlo, Maria Rossotto1, Prasanna, Lal Das2, Elena Gasol Ramos3, Eva Clemente Miranda4, Mona 
Farid Badran5, Martha Martinez Licetti6, and Graciela Miralles Murciego7
Digital platforms in emerging markets are a new phenomenon that deeply disrupts local econ-omies. A full range of tools to exploit the op-
portunities platforms create, while addressing risks, is not 
available to policy makers; regulators, such as competition 
authorities and telecom regulators, are almost learning 
while doing, including on sensitive matters such as mon-
itoring anticompetitive behavior and mergers. Platforms 
in high income markets followed an evolutive process. By 
contrast, developing countries play technology catch up, 
can leapfrog. Electronic identification in India is, for ex-
ample, a massive effort to create, ex novo, a digital plat-
form to support digital services, driving market maturity 
towards digital behaviors. This creates additional pressure 
on policy-makers, to rapidly address changing market con-
ditions with limited analytical tools. The existing literature 
on digital platforms can help policy makers develop an ef-
fective framework for government action. Policy makers 
should address four aspects: first, the definition of multi-
sided-platforms; second, emerging business models; third, 
technology and behavioral enablers; fourth, platform com-
petitive dynamics.
Digital Platform Definition
 Multi-sided platforms (MSP) are multisided marketplac-
es allowing for members of each side to interact through 
tools that facilitate matching, searching, exchanging, and 
carrying out transactions (Evans 2013). MSP benefit from 
positive network externalities, as the utility of each side 
increases with the increased number of participants on 
the other side. The increase in the economic utility of a 
product or technology as more customers start using com-
plementary products or as more suppliers offer comple-
mentary products, is called indirect network effect (Clem-
ents 2004). Actions by upstream or downstream platform 
participants also affect each other, suggesting the need for 
policy makers to assess upstream and downstream markets. 
In addition, the definition of digital platforms does not fit 
within traditional corporate ‘provision of goods and ser-
vices’ making it difficult to define transactions carried out 
within the platform to a given jurisdiction. This creates 
taxation issues, considering the recent EU state aid cases 
against Amazon (Luxembourg) and Apple (Ireland). De-
fining MSP in their jurisdictions can guide policy-makers 
in emerging markets identify taxation-related issues.
Platforms Business Models
A first analysis of emerging business models for mul-
ti-sided platforms (MSP), is present in Rochet and Tirole 
(2003), where the bargaining power of different partici-
pants drives revenues. Digital platforms organise decen-
tralised information, making it available to market par-
ticipants, and drastically slash transaction costs, creating 
new markets. Platforms can have ‘loss leader segments’ 
and ‘profit making segments’. A critical distinction, with 
anti-trust implications, is the distinction between ‘trans-
action-based’ platforms, and ‘non-transaction based’ plat-
forms. Recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) indicated that, when 
analyzing possible anti-competitive behavior, “if a market 
is a non-transaction market, looking at externalities is 
sufficient. If instead the market is a transaction market, 
then one should also check if there are transaction costs 
or, more generally, limits to the bilateral setting of pric-
es among buyers and sellers or if there are platform con-
straints on pricing between customers on the two sides.” 
(OECD 2018).
Using social networks, digital platforms can leverage a 
‘long tail’ of market participants, increasing participants 
The views expressed in the paper are the authors’ only.
Digital platforms are a disruptive force in developing countries, forcing policy makers to design policies to encourage platforms’ broad adoption, 
while proactively addressing emerging risks. This policy framework should address four points. First, the definition of multisided-platforms; second, 
emerging business models; third, technology and behavioral enablers; and, fourth, platform competitive dynamics.
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(‘tail lengthening’) or expanding transactions (‘tail fatten-
ing’). The value to advertisers of capturing long tail mar-
keting data fosters marketplaces, such as MercadoLibre 
and americanas.com in Latin America. Hybrid models join 
MSP-enabled transactions and locational marketing. Four 
models emerged:
• Commission-based
• Subscription-based
• Advertisement-based 
• Service-based 
Platforms in emerging markets often mirror business 
models in high-income markets. Careem is a Dubai-based 
ride-sharing company, operating in 53 cities in the Middle 
East, North Africa, and Asia. The advertisement industry’s 
relative underdevelopment is a constraint to certain mod-
els. This factor may limit the platforms’ ability to subsidize 
the downstream, end-user side of the business. In addition, 
limited development of the advertisement market may en-
courage ‘transactional’ models (often developed by global, 
foreign platforms), to the detriment of pure marketplac-
es, which tend to be local. Policy-makers should assess the 
maturity of the advertisement industry, and its impact on 
business models: are there specific deficiencies that make 
a developing country particularly vulnerable to value-cap-
turing models introduced by foreign platforms?
Platform Enablers
 Digital platforms are the product of an evolutionary 
process mixing physical and behavioral enablers.  Physical 
enablers include digital infrastructure (broadband internet 
networks, cloud, security), smartphones, laptops and other 
consumer equipment, payment tools, geo-localisation, and 
ancillary enablers (e.g. distribution, logistics, intermediary 
goods), (Figure 1).
Market and behavioral enablers are essential (Figure 2). 
Consumers shift their core attitudes from buying goods to 
access-based consumption, leading to a peer-to-peer econ-
omy where platforms increasingly mediate interactions, 
typically coordinated by peer-based trust relationships. 
Individuals casually participate in economic activities 
through privately owned resources (assets, labor), which 
would otherwise remain idle. Platform enablers have pol-
icy implications.
Developing countries often lack a ubiquitous and afforda-
ble broadband internet infrastructure (Kelly and Rossotto 
2012), and internet access is uneven among population 
groups (urban vs. rural, gender, age, and income divide). 
Some countries lack digital payments. Physical and virtual 
platform enablers in developing countries require dedi-
cated policies, technical assistance and investments. Eco-
system enablers were key to Alibaba’s development. Tsai 
(2016) emphasises “the integration of three critical ele-
ments, which are trading platform, payment system and 
logistics network, forms the solid infrastructure for Aliba-
ba e-Commerce business ecosystem”.
Sometimes, the specific economic condition of an emerg-
ing market may incentivise a more widespread platforms 
adoption with respect to high-income markets. Mo-
bile-based payment tools in Africa addresses lack of alterna-
tive digital payment methods and inferior physical options, 
Figure 1. Physical and Virtual Enablers
Source: Authors’ own compilation
Figure 2 .Market and Behavioral Enablers
Source: Authors’ own compilation
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allowing for rapid scaling-up. Digital platforms to match 
labor supply and demand gained traction in Ukraine, the 
Philippines, and Russia, leveraging competitive wages and 
skilled resources. Constraints may encourage innovation. 
Faced with local logistics shortcomings, Jumia Egypt, an 
online marketplace, has built its own motorcycles and de-
livery fleet. Finally, a question for policy makers is whether 
access to capital constrains platforms growth. Large scale 
platforms will attract considerable investments, but local 
startups will experience challenges. 
Platform competitive dynamics
 The dominance of a platform, arising from network ef-
fects (‘winner-takes-all’), may raise competition concerns, 
if the dominant platform abuses its market power. Howev-
er, penalising dominance per se may be inefficient as dom-
inance can also benefit consumers and spur innovation. 
Reaching a ‘critical’ mass drives platform dynamics (Ev-
ans 2013). Ruutu et al. (2017) propose a system dynamics 
simulation model of platform competition, highlighting 
three cases. In the ‘chicken-and-egg’ scenario, no platform 
achieves a critical mass. In the ‘winner-take-all’ scenario a 
vendor locks-in the participants into one dominant plat-
form, even in presence of ‘multi-homing’ options. The fi-
nal scenario, called by other authors ‘winner takes some’, 
provides for a “collaboration and competition scenario in 
which several platforms coexist in balanced competition.” 
(Ruutu et al. 2017). Various models studied the conditions 
for multiple platforms to grow first, and then co-exist in 
competitive markets. Network effects, ‘critical mass’ fac-
tors, and reversibility of participation create entry barriers, 
likely to be more critical in developing countries.
Network effects may lead to situations where a proprie-
tary platform may be socially desirable, as it partially inter-
nalizes two-sided indirect network effects and direct com-
petitive effects on the producer side.  Ruutu et al. (2017) 
indicate that “if platform adopters are able to react quickly, 
achieving a critical mass may be difficult because the plat-
form firms cannot accumulate enough resources for suffi-
cient platform development”. Open interfaces (reinforcing 
cross-side network effects) and user data transferability, 
can accelerate initial growth. These points will shape policy 
choices in developing countries.
Network effects and critical mass considerations could 
skew competition in favor of foreign platforms. However, 
there is evidence that local platforms in emerging markets 
can emerge as strong competitors. Leveraging domestic 
market size, Alibaba and Alipay emerged as global leaders 
(Tsai 2016). Go-Jek is a ‘unicorn’ in Indonesia, and leads 
the local ride-share market. Russian digital platforms rev-
enues exceed $17 billion (World Bank 2018), as Yandex, 
a Russian engine, retained two thirds of Russia’s addressa-
ble market, surpassing the revenues of Google Russia by a 
factor of three. Russian social media network Vkontakte 
outranked Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter in monthly 
messages sent, exceeding 60% share (World Bank 2018). 
Contrary to the idea of sweeping ‘data colonialism’, at least 
in large emerging markets like Russia, Indonesia and Bra-
zil, there are counter-examples of local platforms effective-
ly facing foreign competition. What determines a ‘winner-
takes-some’ scenario in emerging markets? One hypothesis, 
consistent with standard MSP theory, suggests that in a 
two-sided market, ‘winner-takes-all’ prevails, unless there 
is sufficient consumer differentiation to determine an oli-
gopolistic scenario.  A further question is the sustainability 
of ‘winner-takes-some’ scenarios, considering technology 
advances such as artificial intelligence, which will, perhaps, 
reduce linguistic or cultural effects on consumer differ-
entiation. Another aspect is whether local platforms can 
compete only leveraging large domestic markets: foreign 
platforms dominance is a more acute risk in small, poor 
countries. 
While most of the debate focuses on dominance, plat-
forms also raise other competition concerns: colluding 
algorithms, restrictive vertical agreements and potential 
anticompetitive effects of market consolidation. In addi-
tion to network externalities, two other factors character-
ise digital platforms dynamics. The first is envelopment, a 
business strategy by which a platform leverages its digi-
tal or brand presence, to expand its business to services 
outside its initial core. While traditional analysis of ‘tying’ 
as anticompetitive practice does not necessarily hold, the 
rationale is similar. As a digital platform, Google offers ac-
cess to its platform to third party service providers, such 
as online translation software. However, it also develops 
its own online translation software. Client-supplier anal-
ysis in traditional industries calls for non-discriminatory 
access to a distribution platform to be granted to third 
party suppliers, especially when an economic agent acts as 
distributor and retailer. A similar analogy exists in digital 
platforms. Access to the search engine should be granted 
on a non-discriminatory basis to all third-party providers, 
including in-platform providers. Regulatory interven-
tion may be warranted. The European Commission fined 
Google €2.42 billion for market dominance abuse (advan-
tage to its own shopping service in search results). Brazil 
opened a similar investigation. 
The second strategy is partnerships. Latin American plat-
form MercadoLibre partnered with convenience store and 
financial services chain Oxxo, to integrate its distribution 
and service channels. Careem partnered with food delivery 
ChaCha, to address Pakistani’s market. While partnerships 
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can enhance efficiency, they also raise competition con-
cerns. Google’s financial incentives for the largest smart-
phone and tablet manufacturers to exclusively pre-install 
Google Search on their devices, has been considered a ve-
hicle to foreclose competitors. Following a recent investi-
gation in Russia, Google committed to remove restrictions 
and allow third party applications on all devices. Assessing 
the competition impact should include effects on both 
downstream and upstream markets (Frieden 2018). Inno-
vation should be considered in the assessment (Wahyun-
ingtyas 2018).
The use of data by digital platforms, currently core to the 
debate, influences market dynamics, beyond consumer 
protection concerns. The use of data by dominant plat-
forms can become abusive, absent strict controls either 
externally or self-imposed. The latter has worked poorly. 
If data is the price consumers pay to access a given service, 
such as ‘connecting’ via Facebook or ‘searching’ via Goog-
le, lack of transparency with data use might constitute 
abuse of dominant position equivalent to price gouging. 
This line of reasoning brings to consider data as a potential 
essential facility, where the arguments applied to infrastruc-
ture access extend to data. This concern is compounded in 
developing countries. Africa’s mobile operators have an un-
matchable quantity of users’ data, displaying thus a domi-
nant position around commercially sensitive information, 
absent adequate regulation. Platforms need user data to 
keep advertisers onboard. Data portability, enabling users 
“to transfer data from one electronic processing system and 
into another, without being prevented from doing so by 
the controller” (Graef et al. 2015), could be a powerful 
enabler.
Finally, many actors cannot access platforms in emerging 
markets, including consumers without access to internet 
networks or without smartphones, and SMEs with lim-
ited technology access. Hence, a possible rationale exists 
for proactive interventions to promote broad technology 
diffusion. Incentives for global platforms to localise their 
businesses and partner with local firms could be encour-
aged.
In conclusion, analysing these four pillars of the econom-
ic literature may guide policy makers towards appropriate 
policy frameworks for digital platforms in emerging mar-
kets. 
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Regulatory Challenges for Share&Charge Models*
Fanny Vanrykel**, Damien Ernst***, Marc Bourgeois****
The platform Share&Charge provides an innovative solution to the lack of electric vehicles charging infrastructure, lying at the 
crossroad of the electricity market, the transport market and digitalisation. This paper presents the functioning of Share&Charge 
and its potential, before assessing the tax treatment of operations involved in the use of the platform.
Introduction
Electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure is a central aspect of e-mobility deployement. With-out a sufficient number of charging stations, con-
sumer appeal for EVs remains low. The German platform 
Share&Charge offers an innovative solution to this prob-
lem by allowing the sharing of EV charging stations and 
enabling direct transactions between charging station own-
ers and EV drivers in a peer-to-peer fashion1. Relying on 
new technological developments, Share&Charge lies at the 
crossroads of the electricity market, the transport market 
and digitalisation. Although this model creates new op-
portunities for sustainable mobility, it also presents specific 
features, involving new actors and structures that disrupt 
existing frameworks and bring new regulatory challenges. 
This paper intends to examine some of the legal is-
sues associated with the development of platforms like 
Share&Charge. The first part briefly presents the function-
ing of Share&Charge and its potential benefits for EVs 
scale-up, as well as for the deployment of decentralised 
electricity production. The second part is dedicated to the 
tax treatment of operations involved in the use of the plat-
form, assuming that such a scheme would be introduced 
into the Belgian market. As Belgium is a federal State with 
decentralised competences, we assume that all actors with-
in Share&Charge are located in the Walloon Region of 
Belgium. Finally, we conclude with several policy recom-
mendations to foster models like Share&Charge.
Part I. Presentation of Share&Charge – functioning 
and benefits
Share&Charge is an intermediary platform that pro-
vides intermediary services to enable direct transactions 
between charging station owners and EV drivers (Plenter 
et al. 2018). It is operated by the company MotionWerk. 
Via the platform, the operator of a charging station may 
offer access to it for private and commercial customers. 
Share&Charge’s interactive map makes it possible for EV 
owners to find a charging station in the most suitable lo-
cation, for instance at their place of work or where they 
live. The operators set a price (tariff) on Share&Charge for 
their offer. The use of Share&Charge is free of charge for 
the customer, but operators have to pay a usage fee of 15 
percent of the tariff to MotionWerk after the charging pro-
cess. Charging tariffs within the charging station network 
are determined by the operator, but the platform provides 
indicative tariffs (Figure 1).
Two hypotheses can actually be made with respect to this 
model. In the first instance, the operators draw the elec-
1 More information regarding the platform can be found at: https://shareandcharge.com (accessed August 2, 2018).
* An extended version of this paper under the title “Fostering Share&Charge through Proper Regulation” has been submitted for publication to “Competi-
tion and Regulation in Network Industries” and it is currently under review.
** Corresponding and first author, F.N.R.S Research Fellow, ULiège (Tax Institute), +32497688599,  fanny.vanrykel@uliege.be
*** Professor, ULiège, Belgium
**** Professor, ULiège (Tax Institute), Belgium.  
Figure 1. Relations between the users of Share&Charge
Source: Authors’own compilation
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tricity necessary to charge the EVs from the main utility 
grid. By contrast, in the second case, the same amount of 
electricity is self-produced by the operator, for instance 
through a photovoltaic installation.  
Share&Charge presents certain features that could help 
in fostering the deployment of e-mobility and of decen-
tralised electricity production. Firstly, Share&Charge 
help fill the gap of the lack in EVs charging infrastruc-
ture, which represents a major barrier to their market dif-
fusion (Sierzchula, Bakker, Maat, van Wee 2014; Bakker 
and Trip 2013; Graham-Rowe et al. 2012). In particular, 
Share&Charge enables such infrastructure to be directly 
financed by individuals and private companies, as cost is 
being recouped from EV drivers through tariffs set for re-
charging their vehicles. Secundly, by increasing the number 
of charging stations, Share&Charge spreads electricity de-
mand over a greater number of locations. This helps lower 
the impact of EV charging on the electricity grid and on 
electricity demand (Lopes, Soares, Almeida 2011), which 
can be particularly problematic in heavily populated areas. 
Furthermore, where the operator self-produces electricity, 
and upon condition that the electricity production is suffi-
cient to cover the demand, Share&Charge also enables the 
reduction of problems related to grid overload and energy 
losses due to decentralised energy production by enabling 
electricity storage directly within the EV battery instead of 
on the grid, thus establishing local electricity consumption 
through microgrids. This further facilitates the expansion 
of decentralised electricity production and may reduce the 
needs for flexibility in the electricity market through a bet-
ter matching between local energy production and local 
demand. 
Part II. Legal framework and disruption – tax treat-
ment of Share&Charge
Share&Charge presents specific features that pose regula-
tory challenges. In particular, this business model relies on 
a multi-sided platform and is based on decentralised elec-
tricity distribution and production; following the trend of 
the so-called sharing economy, it enables peer-to-peer ac-
cess to EV charging stations and sales of electricity. These 
distinctive elements defy current tax rules, including those 
related to energy taxes (1), personal income tax (2) and val-
ue added tax (VAT) (3)2. Although we concentrate on Bel-
gian tax law, the questions envisaged could be applicable 
in other countries. They could also provide arguments for 
further harmonisation at an European Union (EU) level.  
Energy taxes
When European directives on the liberalisation of the 
electricity market were adopted, electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution were predominantly central-
ised3. This reality has progressively evolved, with the emer-
gence of decentralised forms of electricity production and, 
more recently, microgrids. Current regulatory frameworks, 
both at the EU level and at the domestic level appear to 
have been overtaken by such new market developments. 
In Belgium, peer-to-peer sale of electricity remains unreg-
ulated; there is no specific legal provision that determines 
which rules should apply when one individual sells elec-
tricity to another individual. 
The lack of specific framework on peer-to-peer sales of 
electricity poses several problems regarding energy taxes. 
Indeed, to determine the person liable for electricity taxes, 
tariffs and levies in the Share&Charge model, it is neces-
sary to characterise the operators: should they be qualified 
as ‘electricity distributors’(or suppliers) or, rather as ‘end 
consumers’. In Belgian law, there is a clear distinction be-
tween these two concepts. An end consumer is defined as 
“any individual or legal entity buying electricity for its own 
use”4. This qualification will give rise to the payment of 
a number of taxes, levies and tariffs, including taxes on 
energy consumption and surcharges to support to the cost 
of a number of public policies and services. On the con-
trary, electricity distributors, which must be understood 
as an electricity supplier, qualify as the taxable person for 
the purpose of the energy contribution (Law of July 22, 
19935). They are defined as “the individual or legal entity 
selling electricity or gas on their account or on behalf of 
others”6. 
As the law currently stands, there is no clear answer to 
this paradox. Nevertheless, despite current developments 
from the Walloon regulatory authority (Cwape) and of the 
Walloon parliament, it seems hard to consider, without 
stretching the concepts, operators of charging stations as 
2 Energy taxation is understood in a broad meaning, including taxes sensu stricto, but also other parafiscal levies on energy like fees, tariffs, etc. Issues regard-
ing corporate income tax will not be addressed; we will concentrate solely on the relationships between the operator and the customer. On this question, see 
the Proposal for a Council Directive of March, 21, 2018 on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain 
digital services, COM(2018) 148 final; and the Proposal for a Council Directive of March 1, 2018 laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a 
significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final.    
3 See Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 19, 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in elec-
tricity, Official Journal L27, January 30, 1997 P. 20-29.
4 See for instance Art. 2, 14°, of the federal law of April 29, 1999 on the organisation of the electricity market, Belgian Official Journal of May 11, 1999. 
5 Federal law introducing an energy contribution to safeguard competitiveness and employment, Belgian Official Journal of July 24, 1993. 
6 Art. 424 of the Program law of December 27, 2004, Belgian Official Journal of December 31, 2004. 
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end consumers7. In the event that these operators are not 
characterised as end consumers, they would be part of the 
electricity supply chain, and the end consumer would be 
the customer of the operator of a charging station. Such 
a qualification would imply several (undesirable) conse-
quences. Notably, it would characterise operators as the 
taxable persons of the energy contribution, and require 
them to obtain a license for electricity supply. These ele-
ments call for a legislative intervention, in order to clarify 
the current legal framework and to adapt it to models like 
Share&Charge.
Further difficulties arise for users of Share&Charge in 
relation with the tarriffs charged when access is provid-
ed to the charging station. In the Share&Charge model, 
the operators determine themselves the tariffs to be paid 
by the customers when charging their EV, even though 
the platform provides indicative tariffs. Setting the tariffs 
can be troublesome for the operators although this repre-
sents a critical operation; they need to remain competi-
tive with other operators of EV charging stations within 
Share&Charge but they also should make a profit or at 
least not lose money. Determination of the tariffs will be 
particularly delicate when the electricity used to charge 
the EV is self-produced by the operator. In this instance, 
they will need to take into account electricity consumed 
and electricity produced, which can be both unpredictible. 
For these reasons, and considering the fact that the oper-
ator may likely be an individual who does not necessarily 
have specialised knowledge and experience regarding the 
electricity market, there could be a case for provision of 
support services in order to assist the operator in setting 
appropriate tariffs. This role could be played by existing 
actors such as distribution system operators or regulators. 
Alternatively, there could be room for a new market seg-
ment to develop.
Personal income tax  
Share&Charge represents the perfect example of what is 
known as the ‘sharing economy’. As noted by the Europe-
an Commission, the collaborative – or sharing – economy 
obscures and distorts “established lines between consumer 
and provider, employee and self-employed, or the profes-
sional and non-professional provision of services”8. Within 
the Share&Charge model, several issues arise regarding the 
qualification of pieces of income for the purpose of the per-
sonal income tax treatment. Belgian tax law distinguishes 
between four categories of income: professional income, 
income from movable property, income from immovable 
property, and miscellaneous income. Qualifying the form 
of income is critical as each income category is governed by 
its own rules, which allows for the determination of what 
is taxable income, its amount, and the deductions that ap-
ply. In addition, it is necessary to determine whether the 
income resulting from different operations must be taxed 
separately, under different categories, or instead should be 
taxed together, within one single category.
Characterisation of the income will depend on the spe-
cific elements of each situation; it will be assessed on 
a case-by-case analysis, based on various criteria such as 
activity financing with high levels of credits, whether the 
activity is the extension of or closely linked to a profes-
sional activity, the number and the frequency of the oper-
ations/transactions and remunerations (Tiberghien 2018, 
n°1096). Elements such as access limitation to the plat-
form for a maximal cumulated period and for a maximal 
amount of income generated through the platform rep-
resent arguments in favour of non-professional income9. 
Share&Charge’s terms and conditions, on the contrary, do 
not contain such limitations. If the income is regarded as 
non-professional, it is necessary to determine in which re-
maining category it belongs: income from movable prop-
erty, income from immovable property and miscellaneous 
income. In that case, income resulting from the sale of elec-
tricity will be regarded as a miscellanous income10, while 
income resulting from the use of the EV charging station 
within the Share&Charge model should be qualified, in 
our view, as income resulting from an immovable property. 
Alternatively, both income could be taxed together, as one 
single piece of income. 
It is interesting to note that since recently, miscellaneous 
income resulting from the sharing economy benefits from 
7 More specifically see note CD‐13k07‐CWaPE of September 12, 2013 on the conditions to fulfill for an end consumer to be considered a produc-
er in the specific hypothesis of an ordinary lease or a ‘all included’ rental of buildings equipped with PV panels, accessible at https://www.cwape.
be/?dir=3&news=293, last accessed August, 2, 2018, which complements the Guidelines CD‐13k07‐CWaPE of September 12, 2013 on the conditions to 
fulfill for an end consumer to be considered a producer ; decision CD-10d13-Cwape of April 13, 2010, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/?dir=0.2&do-
cid=134, last accessed August, 2, 2018; and decision CD-17h11-Cwape of August 10, 2017, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/?dir=0.2&docid=3248, last 
accessed August, 2, 2018; Draft bill of January 1, 2018, modifying the Decree of April 12, 2004, on the electricity market organisation for the deployment 
of smart meters and flexibility, in particular Art. 9, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/?dir=4&news=772, last accessed August, 2, 2018. See also the advice 
of the Cwape: Advice CD-18c01-CWaPE-1771 of March 2, 2018, on the Draft bill of January 1, 2018, modifying the Decree of April 12, 2004, on the 
electricity market organization for the deployment of smart meters and flexibility, in particular p. 19, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/?dir=4&news=772, 
last accessed August, 2, 2018.
8 Communication of June 2, 2016, COM(2016) 356 final, p. 2.
9 Belgian Ruling Authority, Ruling n°2015.455 of September 29, 2015. For more information see https://www.ruling.be/fr/telechargement/decisions, 
accessed August 2, 2018
10 Chamber of the Representatives, Oral questions n° 5400 et 5401 of 20 May 2008; n° 587 of July 15, 2009.
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a preferential tax rate11. However, the scope of this favour-
able scheme is rather narrow as it only applies to benefits 
and profits resulting from services (Art. 90, 1st lid, 1°bis, 
Income Tax Code hereafter ‘ITC’), exluding income re-
sulting from the supply of goods. Although these concepts 
are not defined, we would argue that income resulting 
from the use of Share&Charge must not be considered to 
result from supply of services. Arguably, one could purport 
that a portion of the supply should be regarded as a supply 
of service. In this case, this piece of income would be treat-
ed favourably, accordingly with Art. 90, lid 3 ITC. 
VAT
Unlike personal income tax which is calculated based 
purely on national rules, VAT has been harmonised at EU 
level. To determine the VAT treatment of the transactions, 
several questions need to be answered including ‘who is 
the taxable person’ and ‘what are the taxable transactions’. 
As underlined by the European Commission, collabora-
tive platforms pose several difficulties in this regard: “[p]
roblems may arise in respect of the qualification of partic-
ipants as taxable persons, particularly regarding the assess-
ment of economic activities carried on, or the existence of 
a direct link between the supplies and the remuneration in 
kind (…)” (Beretta 2018).12 In addition, characterisation 
as a taxable person can be burdensome for individuals, es-
pecially when their activity generates modest value, since 
such qualification implies to fulfil several obligations: noti-
fying the existence of an economic activity, issuing regular 
invoices, keeping regular accounts and submitting periodic 
and regular VAT returns, etc13.
A first issue is to determine who from the operator or 
MotionWerk must be considered the taxable person vis-
à-vis activities supplied to the customer. After, it is nec-
essary to assess whether sharing of the charging station, 
and the subsequent sale of electricity must be considered 
an economic activity. The first issue brings us to the deli-
cate distinction between undisclosed agents, who act in the 
name and on behalf on someonelse, and disclosed agents 
(or commissioner), who act in their own names. It must be 
noted that the concept of intermediaries in the presence of 
platforms has been interpreted in other fields of law by the 
European Court of Justice, with respect to the platform 
Uber14. In two judgements, the Court concluded that 
Uber was not a mere intermediation service provider, but 
rather performed transport services. Nevertheless, because 
11 Program Law of July 1, 2016, Belgian Official Journal July 4, 2016. See Afschrift 2016; Mariscal & Ickx 2016.
12 Communication of June 2, 2016 on the Agenda collaborative economy, aforementioned note 34.
13 Title VIII of VAT code.
14 E.C.J. Elite Taxi v. Uber Systems SpainSL, C-434/15, December 20, 2017 ; E.C.J., Uber France SAS, C-320/16, April 10, 2018.
15 Respectively Art. 15 Directive 2006/112 & Art. 9 Belgian VAT code, and Art. 24 & f. Directive 2006/112 & Art. 18 Belgian VAT code.
16 See notably E.C.J., Město Žamberk, C-18/12, February 21, 2013; E.C.J., Levob Verzekeringen and OV Bank, C-41/04, October 27, 2005, especially § 
22; E.C.J., Part Service, C-425/06, February 21, 2008, especially § 53; E.C.J., C-497/09, Bog and Others, especially § 53; E.C.J., CPP, C-349/96, Febru-
ary 25, 1999, in particular § 30.
  
VAT encompasses autonomous concepts, one should be 
cautious when attempting to draw conclusions from these 
developments; it is uncertain whether they could be trans-
lated to VAT law or not. Depending on the interpretation, 
the VAT treatment of the operations performed in the con-
text of Share&Charge will profoundly vary. 
The second question is to determine whether the opera-
tions supplied characterise as economic activities. In Bel-
gian VAT law, a favourable treatment applies to activities 
of the sharing economy, based on the premise that such 
activities are not economic activities. Under this scheme, 
the supply of services performed in the context of the 
sharing economy is not, upon the respect of several con-
ditions, subject to VAT, and suppliers of these services are 
not taxable persons for the purpose of VAT. In the case of 
Share&Charge, because the intervention of the operator of 
Share&Charge includes a supply of goods (electricity sup-
ply), it will fall outside the scope of this favourable scheme.
Ultimately, determining the VAT treatment of opera-
tions supplied within Share&Charge requires to qualify 
these transactions. Electricity supply must be regarded as 
a supply of goods, while the supply of access to the station 
is a supply of a service. Both transactions are liable to a 
VAT rate of 21 percent15. Services of intermediation, when 
MotionWerk is considered an undisclosed agent, arguably 
constitute electronically supplied services, as referred to in 
Art. 56 of the VAT Directive. Depending on the inter-
pretation, these operations will be regarded as one single 
economic transaction or, on the contrary, as two distinct 
operations16.  
Conclusion and policy recommendations
Markets have entered into a digital age. Digitalisation 
impacts most aspects of everyday life, ranging from com-
muting, ordering food, to renting an apartment or a car, or 
just chatting on the phone. It can be admittedly a source 
of certain abuse, but it is also a factor of progress, which 
creates many societal and economic opportunities. Based 
on this background, the Share&Charge model offers new 
opportunities for EVs market diffusion and for decentral-
ised electricity production devolpment. To foster business 
models like Share&Charge, the following modifications to 
current regulations could be implemented: 
• Firstly, uncertainties have been observed regarding 
the legal qualification of several elements, such as the 
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qualification of the operator with respect to energy 
taxes, or of MotionWerk as a taxable person with 
regard to VAT. Yet these are essential to accurately 
assess the tax treatment of operations associated with 
the use of Share&Charge. The adoption of guidelines 
at the EU level or the modification or current direc-
tives should be considered to remove unclarity.
• Secondly, one feature of the sharing economy is that 
transactions and activities are not necessarily per-
formed by professionals. Therefore, if participants 
are treated just as any professional exercising an eco-
nomic activity, they may be subject to an excessive 
burden, which would risk impeding the furtherance 
of their activities. Current frameworks should be 
modified to take this element into account. In ad-
dition, services could be performed by regulators, 
DSOs, or by new actors, to assist operators to set 
appropriate tariffs for the provision of electricity.
• Thirdly, income generated and operations performed 
by the operator do not currently benefit from any 
financial support, nor do they benefit from the fa-
vourable tax scheme applicable to the sharing econ-
omy. Further studies are required to assess whether 
financial support is needed to foster the development 
of such a model as Share&Charge. 
• Finally, the Share&Charge model merely involves 
internal relations within one jurisdiction. Many le-
gal questions would arise, including those of tax base 
erosion, profit shifting and of double imposition, if 
that was not the case. These issues also deserve due 
attention among scholars and policy makers.
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SAVE THE DATE
For information on the agenda and registrati-
on for all these events, please, contact us at 
fsr.transport@eui.eu
B u d a p e s t  A i r  F o r u m 
N o v e m b e r  9 ,  2 0 1 8
Following the usual approach of the Florence School of Regulation, stakeholders and academics will join 
the Air Forum, for the first time being organized in Budapest, and actively debate the most important 
topics in the field of air transport. On this occasion, the discussion will revolve around the Single European 
Sky (SES) and its development in the coming 10-15 years.
F l o r e n c e  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  R a i lw a y s 
N o v e m b e r  1 6  a n d  1 7,  2 0 1 8
Regulation of the railway industry and its various dimensions, not the least competition, is central factor in 
the process of its transformation and will ultimately decide whether railways will or will not increase their 
modal share. At the conference papers will be presented, covering the various aspects of railway regulation 
and focusing either on a country or a region, or on more transversal issues such as competition, tendering, 
high-speed services, intermodality, digital mobility/railway platforms and others more. The conference is 
intended for academics such as PhD students, PostDocs and assistant/associate/full Professors, as well as 
academically minded practitioners. The Conference is organized by the Transport Area of the Florence 
School of Regulation of the European University Institute (Florence) and UNED University (Madrid).
1 7 t h  F l o r e n c e  R a i l  F o r u m .  G r e e n  F i n a n c e  a g a i n s t  C l i m a t e 
C h a n g e  –  w h i c h  r o l e  f o r  R a i lw a y s ? 
D e c e m b e r  7,  2 0 1 8
Following the usual approach of the Florence School of Regulation, stakeholders and academics will 
join the 17th Florence Rail Forum to discuss the most pressing rail regulatory issues. On this occasion, 
the discussion will revolve around the topic of “Green Finance against Climate Change – which role for 
Railways?”. We will assess how railways can become a more effective tool in the fight against climate change, 
in particular by looking at green financing and by exploring the various green financing mechanisms as 
potentially applicable to railways.
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Matthias Finger, Maxime Audouin (Eds.)
The Governance of Smart 
Transportation Systems
Towards New Organizational Structures for the Development of Shared, 
Automated, Electric and Integrated Mobility
Series: The Urban Book Series
Provides comprehensive information on what smart mobility is and what 
challenges it entails
Draws on various case studies to show how smart mobility can be effectively 
governed
Paves the way for much-needed further research on the governance of smart 
transportation systems
This book presents essential new governance structures to embrace and regulate smart 
mobility modes. Drawing on a range of case studies, it paves the way for new approaches to 
governing future transportation systems. Over the past decades, Information and 
Communication Technologies have enabled the development of new mobility solutions that 
have completely redefined traditional and well-established urban transportation systems. Urban 
transportation systems are evolving dramatically, from the development of shared mobility 
modes, to the advent of electric mobility, and from the automated mobility trend to the rapid 
spread of integrated transportation schemes. Given the disruptive nature of those new mobility 
solutions, new governance structures are needed. Through a series of case studies from 
around the world, this book highlights governance and regulatory processes having supported, 
or sometimes prevented, the development and implementation of smart mobility solutions 
(shared, automated, electric, integrated). The combination of chapters offers a comprehensive 
overview of the different research endeavours focusing on the governance of smart 
transportation systems and will help pave the way for this important subject, which is crucial 
for the future of cities.
Lifelong 40% discount for authors
 Part of
Order online at springer.com / or for the Americas call (toll free) 1-800-SPRINGER /
or email us at: customerservice@springernature.com. / For outside the Americas call +49 (0) 6221-345-4301 /
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 20, issue 4, 2018 (December) 
“The path towards digitalization in road infrastructure”
Presentation of the next issue
Any region or country requires an efficient and effective transportation system as the fundamental basis for economic 
development, creation of jobs, and, ultimately, improvement of the citizens’ well-being. Over the last centuries, roads 
have served well, connecting regions and facilitating economic trade. Roads became the backbone of transportation sys-
tems, unlocking the development growth in many regions and countries. For example, in the EU, roads are responsible 
for 75% of freight transport and nearly 90% of passenger transport. But there is a new challenge that will reshape the 
way we build, manage and operate roads: digitalization. 
Digitalization in the road sector is changing the traditional service-based perspective, where the infrastructure is at the 
center of the strategy, towards a user-based perspective, offering solutions to improve and optimise travels, provide addi-
tional services, foster integrated and shared mobility solutions, allowing roads to become an active (and smart) element 
of the physical and digital mobility system. 
What are the challenges for road managers? What can the users expect from the new user-based perspective? Will con-
gestion be a problem of the past? Will ‘smart’ roads be cheaper or more expensive? Will technology change the decision-
making process for the selection and management of road projects? 
These are some examples of questions to be addressed in this special issue, containing a set of contributions that could 
stimulate future research in this promising field. 
Guest Editor
The guest editor of this special issue is Dr. Carlos Oliveira Cruz, Assistant Professor at Instituto Superior Técnico (Uni-
versity of Lisbon) and a Researcher at Civil Engineering Research and Innovation for Sustainability (CERIS), oliveira.
cruz@tecnico.ulisboa.pt
OPEN CALL FOR PAPERS
Vol. 20, issue 4, 2018 (December)
We invite authors to submit an article to the special issue “The path 
towards digitalization in road infrastructure”
Should you be willing to submit and article and may need further information,
please send an email to Ms. Irina Lapenkova FSR.Transport@eui.eu
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Implementation of the liberalization process has brought various 
challenges to incumbent firms operating in sectors such as air transport, 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, water and railways, as well as to 
new entrants, to regulators and to the public authorities.
Therefore, the Network Industries Quarterly is aimed at covering research 
findings regarding these challenges, to monitor the emerging trends, as well 
as to analyze the strategic implications of these changes in terms of regulation, 
risks management, governance and innovation in all, but also across, the 
different regulated sectors. 
The Network Industries Quarterly, published by the Chair MIR (Management 
of Network Industry, EPFL) in collaboration with the Transport Area of the 
Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute), is an open 
access journal funded in 1998 and, since then, directed by Prof Matthias Finger.
Open Call For Papers
The Network Industries Quarterly is a multidisciplinary international 
publication. Each issue is coordinated by a guest editor, who chooses four 
to six different articles all related to the topic chosen. Articles must be high-
quality, written in clear, plain language. They should be original papers 
that will contribute to furthering the knowledge base of network industries 
policy matters. Articles can refer to theories and, when appropriate, deduce 
practical applications. Additionally, they can make policy recommendations 
and deduce management implications. 
Detailed guidelines on how to submit the articles and coordinate the issue 
will be provided to the selected guest editor. 
Article Preparation
Published four times a year, the Network Industries Quarterly contains short analytical 
articles about postal, telecommunications, energy, water, transportation and network 
industries in general. It provides original analysis, information and opinions on current 
issues. Articles address a broad readership made of university researchers, policy 
makers, infrastructure operators and businessmen. Opinions are the sole responsibility 
of the author(s). Contact fsr.transport@eui.eu to subscribe. Subscription is free. 
Additional Information
More Information
• network-industries.org
• mir.epfl.ch
• florence-school.eu
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Irina Lapenkova, Managing Editor:
irina.lapenkova@eui.eu
Ozan Barış Süt, Designer: 
ozanbarissut@gmail.com
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